

Series I
Correspondence,
1932-1973

Box 1, Folder 27

Sept. 15, 1945 -
Sept. 28, 1945

Frame: 0849

June 1945-September 1945

This is the Major PT Boat File and should
be kept intact as such.

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Outgoing Letters, June-September 1945

Memo to Lieutenant Faulkner, 12 June 1945
Indicative of planning for moving a PT Boat Base and Ops

Memo to Lieutenant Searles, 12 June 1945
Same as above

Letter to Everest, 17 June 1945
Same as above

Letter to Kincaid, 17 June 1945
Planning and attitudes

Dear General (Larsen), 17 June 1945
Generally good letter

Dear Jimmy (Carter), 17 June 1945
Good letter

Dear Jimmy (Carter), 21 June 1945
Okay

Dear Admiral (Oldendorf), 21 June 1945
Good comment--General Buckner and Admiral Royal deaths

Dear Garland, 21 June 1945
Good letter

Dear Henry (Hederman), 29 June 1940
Excellent discussion of revision of USF 10 Tactical
Doctrine.

Dear Frog (Low), 29 June 1945
Same as above

Captain Parker, 12 July 1945
General comments

Dear Mathis, 14 July 1945
Good comments on intelligence

Dear Admiral (Oldendorf), 14 July 1945
Good general letter--USF 10

Memo for Commodore Carter, 15 July 1945
Excellent discussion of PT operations

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*Dear Eddie (Captain Solomons), 18 July 1945
Excellent comment on planning, particularly intelligence.

Commander Warfield, 21 July
Officer personnel and chain of command

Swede (Overesch), 24 July 1945
Good general letter

Fred Kirtland, n.d., probably 24-27 July 1945
Base for PT's on Okinawa

Memo for Allan Quynn, 27 July 1945
PT Base affairs

Warfield, 26 July
Morale and discipline

Faulkner, 27 July 1945
PT boat performance standards

Memo for WHP Blandy, 27 July 1945
Performance of USS MINNEAPOLIS

To CinC Pac Flt, 28 July 1945
Transfer of PT Squads from 7th Fleet

Dear Jimmy, 30 July
Comprehensive discussion of PT boats--capabilities and limits

Dear Duffy, 2 August 1945
Comment on action analysis

Scruggs, 2 August 1945
Comments on personnel assignment

*Admiral Ike, 3 August
Personal attitude

Ore, 3 August
FDR and Truman

Dear Admiral (Kalbfus), 3 August
Comment on mental preparation--lack of on part of good operators.

Memo for Commander Walsh, 5 August
Type of planning .

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Dear Jake, 6 August
Generally good letter

Dear Commodore, 2 August 1945
American-British relations in Pacific

Dear Earl (Admiral Mills Buships), 13 August 1945
Commentary on PT boat engine packard

To Kemble, 24 September
PT boat history

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MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRONS PACIFIC FLEET
Office of the Commander

15 September 1945

Dear Charles:

Ever since the enemy decided to surrender I have wanted to write you a letter to tell you how we, at sea, feel concerning your accomplishments. Yours is a silent service and, therefore, it has not succeeded in receiving the popular write-ups, and almost adulation, that has been heaped upon the Air Force. However, we in the Pacific as well as the more intelligent public, realize the tremendous effectiveness of your submarines, and we are confident that when all information is available to the public, Submarines Pacific will have carved their name deeply into the nitch of fame.

It is a tremendous thing that you have accomplished! Just think of it! Millions of tons of enemy shipping severely damaged or sent to the bottom. Here is a major cause for the collapse of Japan, and Submarines Pacific did it. Shades of Mahan and his studies upon lines of communications!

I think that the Fleet well knows that an organization invariably reflects its Commander. Nelson had his band of brothers, but I think that even Nelson's brothers were scarcely as close, or as heroic, or as devoted to their Commander and their Country as are their counterparts in our Submarine Service.

It is a great tribute to your leadership that you were able to handle these young men as effectively as you have. Your appeal to their sportsmanship and youth by your Convoy College and other equally interesting psychological devices will, I think, be studied with interest by historians and psychologists after this war. Further, I think, that this approach to your personnel is one of the outstanding causes for the exceptional success of the submarines. You insured that, insofar as the submarine personnel were concerned, they were always playing a game - a deadly game it is true - but fortunately far more deadly for the enemy than for themselves, although no one can say that we did not suffer our share of heavy losses in the Submarine Service.

I feel quite emotional when I think of your Command. The type of personnel who seek service in the submarines are, in many ways, similar to those who seek service in the motor torpedo boats. They are courageous, spontaneous and individualistic - although they work well together within their ship - and are always seeking to close the enemy. They represent young America at its best!

I observed you many times during the course of this war and, during some of those times, I know that you were considerably worried regarding the disappearance of some of your submarines - to say nothing of new

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15 September 1945

enemy tactics being developed against them. No one to see you or to speak to you would have noted that this worry was in any way apparent. You always maintained a calm demeanor, and a carefree and well-laundered exterior. I am sure that your ability to absorb punishment in this manner had a very marked effect upon your Captains and contributed in a large way towards victory.

And finally, I congratulate you upon the place in history which you, and your submarines, have obtained for yourselves by courage and performance alone.

With warmest personal regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES,
Commodore, USN.

Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, Jr., USN
Commander Submarines Pacific
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

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MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRONS PACIFIC FLEET
Office of the Commander

18 September 1945

Dear Admiral Bill:

With the war at an end I suppose that you are feverishly rolling up your area, as I am attempting to do with the motor torpedo boats. As the entire Navy is rolling up, each and every one of us, who is a thinker, cannot fail to be impressed with the logistics problem involved. So it becomes evident to all of us that logistics meets us, coming and going, throughout our entire Naval career. Unfortunately the United States Navy, throughout the years, has never seriously thought of logistics but has, for some reason, imagined that logistics consisted solely and simply of putting ammunition and stores on board a ship and sending her out to sea for 60 days. If this war has done nothing else it has, I hope, thoroughly cleared our Naval minds of such an illusion.

Some years ago I had the interesting good fortune to pick up a series of lectures delivered by, now Field Marshal, Sir Archibald Wavell before Cambridge or Oxford Universities on the subject of Command. In these lectures Sir Archibald stressed the vital importance of logistics in any operation. He said that he had searched history thoroughly for a suitable definition of Command and that the best one he had found was written by Socrates several thousand years ago. Socrates wrote that, among other things, the Commander must first and foremost have a knowledge of supply.

So I thought in view of the fact that you had been, until very recently, in supreme command of logistics in the Pacific, that I would write you a note to tell you how we feel about you.

We remember that years ago when you were a Lieutenant and were Gunnery Officer of the armored cruiser MARYLAND, you won all of the gunnery trophies in the Navy. We remember that later you were ordered to the Destroyers, Battleforce, where your division was so outstandingly excellent for two years that the President addressed you a letter of Presidential approval. Later, we remember that you were ordered to the MARYLAND as Navigator under that stalwart Captain, Frank H. Clark, and that you two produced a ship which was outstanding among all of the new battleships. We remember that later you were Chief of Staff for Battleships, Battleforce and finally, when the war broke out, were in command of what was then known as the "Train".

As usual your good luck and your ability held for, before we knew it, we were at war with our deadly enemy in the Pacific. Your command grew into the great Service Force Pacific - which command contributed as much as any other command towards victory. Planes cannot fly, ships cannot move, without oil and gasoline. Guns cannot fire without ammunition, nor men live without food. All of these items plus many others such as planes, guns and medical equipment; disinfectants and housekeeping equipment must be shipped to the combat areas. The SeaBees could not have

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attained their fame without the equipment with which they did their meritorious work. There is nothing like "logistics" in the world.

And so I feel, on behalf of all of us at sea who have profited by the remarkable performance of the Service Force Pacific Fleet, that I should write to tell you how deeply indebted our Navy and our Nation are to you for the excellence of your performance.

I have always felt quite proud that I have known you for 124 these many years. I am particularly glad, therefore, that I am out here and thus entitled to say to you, if a subordinate may say so, - Well Done.

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES,
Commodore, USN.

Vice Admiral William L. Calhoun, USN
Commander South Pacific Forces
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

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MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRONS PACIFIC FLEET
Office of the Commander

20 September 1945.

Dear Palmer:

I received your letter with a great deal of regret because it indicated that you were having difficulties in the Navy which is, naturally, not the way I should like it. It seems almost incredible that, with the excellent record you say you have, you should have missed out on advancement. The only thought that I can give you in this connection is this -- you have served on shore entirely since you came into the "avy. For the Army this would have been quite satisfactory but, for the Navy, naturally, some duty must be served at sea. I don't know exactly what your career has been but I remember that you first went to Quonset, thence to Guantanamo, thence to Pearl, thence to Saipan and finally to Kwajalein.

This indicates, unless my information is wrong, that you have not been assigned any sea duty. The Navy tries not to promote into the higher ranks younger officers who have not had sea duty, although you will find many officers without sea duty being advanced to higher rank for some special reason or other. Also you have always, at least in the Pacific, been associated with NATS. As NATS will probably be dissolved after the war you can see that service in it, no matter how well done, will not contribute too much towards postwar Naval plans.

I am very sorry that this has happened to you because I have no doubt but that you have worked hard and faithfully, and that your fitness reports are as you say, either good or outstanding. You always were an original sort of fellow, so I haven't any doubt but that you have contributed a great deal towards the success of the NATS. However, many circumstances enter when an officer is up for promotion -- not the least of which is a lack of knowledge of those voting on him as to his personality. This should not be so, but it is very so in the Naval system and, unfortunately, when the Naval system breaks down, it can almost always be traced to this personal factor. We see it in all ranks and, here and there, someone must pay for other peoples mistakes.

However, the Naval system is supposed to be the best there is and we have lived under it for about twenty years and have, as a whole, found it reasonably effective.

You seem to be one of those who, having had no sea duty and not having any particular friend on the Board who understood your capabilities and was able to amplify to the other members if necessary, was considered not as desirable for advancement as those other officers who were under consideration -- I think primarily because they have had sea duty.

I shall write to Washington and see what I can find out about this but the chance of receiving any definite answer is very small. There are a great many officers who are considered in every case and it is doubtful if any member of the Board can remember any particular officer.

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20 September 1945.

I am awfully glad to hear that you have enjoyed, and are enjoying, the Naval service and I am glad the NATS have given you such responsibility. Saipan was very important and I have no doubt that Kwajalein is even more so, as it is a sort of crossroads.

You are not the only officer who has done very well and who has been overlooked by the Selection Board. I know other officers here in the Leyte Area who are considered exceptionally fine — one of them in particular having served as our Intelligence Officer in ComBatRonOne at Lingayen. He told me one day that he had not been promoted which surprised me a great deal.

Please remember me most kindly to your family when you write. I have always been devoted to your father and mother and I have every reason to believe they have every reason to be proud of their son.
Very sincerely yours,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES,
Commodore, USN.

Lieutenant Palmer Field, USNR
NATS Detachment
Navy No. 824
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

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MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRONS PACIFIC FLEET
Office of the Commander

22 September 1945

Dear Randall:

Thank you for your letter of September 12th. Needless to say, I was glad to hear from you, and, naturally, I realize the reason for your delay. Demobilization is a very busy business.

Thanks very much for your interest, but I desire that you forget all about getting me anybody now. We are demobilizing the Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons Pacific command, and, as you suggest, we are succeeding in getting rid of a few rather than asking for a few. Here and there we may need warrant officers or we may need a commanding officer, such as we do for the Acontius and the Cyrene, but normally we have ample for our own needs.

I must disagree with you thoroughly about impressing one of my bright lads into being my Personnel Officer. Our office here had just been formed when I sent word to you, and there was practically no one in it from top to bottom, including yeomen who were familiar with the personnel situation in the Pacific. Some of them are well informed on ordinary routine matters, but the Pacific has its own problems the same as the Atlantic. My Personnel Officer knew as much as any other officer available in personnel - which was exactly zero. He has labored mightily and is improving rapidly. Fortunately, a couple of days ago the Department ordered another personnel man to help, and I am all right on that score now. I hope you are not getting the impression, in any portion of your areas in the Pacific, that it is solely necessary to take some bright young lad and make him Personnel Officer. It functions on your Staff, to a degree, but there you have people already trained who can help with advice. However, the experiences of my emissaries to you have all been that each officer consulted gave them a different answer. I am not saying this to be critical because I realize the difficulties under which you are functioning, but I do think that you should be informed that this condition is existing. As an example, you told my representative that I had nothing to do with the functional units and that it was a problem of the Area Commander, and yet you sent me a dispatch, which I am attaching here as an example, which indicates exactly the opposite.

We are in a serious condition in this area because of a lack of transportation. At Base 17, which is not equipped for even 1,000 men - really for 500 men - we have over 4,000 because there is nothing available to take the men away. I am transferring 1,100 men, roughly, to the Philippine Sea Frontier now which may relieve the load, but that depends upon when the Philippine Sea Frontier decides to take the men away. If we don't have epidemics in this Leyte Area we will be lucky.

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22 September 1945

I should like very much to get to Pearl to discuss the matters which have been bothering me - three items:

- (a) Demobilization.
- (b) Decommissioning.
- (c) Historical.

However, when I asked CinCPac for permission to come over and see them they said no, not now, but later. I realize that they are busy in the Supreme Command and that the Motor Torpedo Boats don't loom up very big at present. However, I can clear up in a few minutes matters that may take my subordinates a month to handle. However, if CinCPac doesn't desire to see me I am certainly the last person in the world that wants to go there. If you could do anything towards getting rid of the people in this area, it would be quite a boon to everyone. I have just issued orders for all of my Squadrons, designated for disposal, to cut down their personnel - officers and men - one third, and I am going to make them available to you right away - that is the enlisted personnel - the officers are to be made available to BuPers. If these men are required and they must be - judging from dispatches - there should be some means of removing them from this area.

Take care of yourself and forget me, but don't forget to get rid of my personnel that are available either for further transfer or for demobilization.

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES.

Commodore Randall E. Dees, USN
Staff - Commander Service Force Pacific Fleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

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MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRONS PACIFIC FLEET
Office of the Commander.

24 September 1945

Dear Kemble:

This letter will serve to introduce to you, Lieutenant (jg) Carl F. Imhof, USNR, whom I have designated as one of my historians.

The question of an Administrative History of the PT's had been one which had been entirely forgotten by the historians of the Navy Department, as well as by the historical branches in this area. From the correspondence at hand now, I note that it wasn't until 2 August that anyone realized that something should be done on an Administrative History of the Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons Pacific, and a letter was sent to me indicating that the motor torpedo boats were to be included in the historical conception. This letter arrived on this ship about 10 August, but as the ship was under conversion alongside a tender, and as the Flag had no office, the letter was lost until the end of August when it was suddenly discovered somewhere and was brought to me for the first time. At this time my Staff was also under the process of formation and many of the members had not as yet reported on board, so that the entire set-up was very hodge-podge.

About the time that I received the letter directing that ComKTBronsPac prepare a history I received a letter from Admiral Kalbfus, a copy of which I have given Lieutenant (jg) Imhof, which letter stated that they were planning to write three histories in Washington as follows:

- (a) The Operational History which was now underway.
- (b) The Administrative History which was not as yet underway, but which they planned to start immediately, and which they had a competent man lined up to do
- (c) A factual Narrative History which they requested I permit Commander Buckley to do.

Commander Buckley accepted the assignment and agreed to stay in the Navy long enough to write it. He has been detached and was directed to report to you on his way East. I imagine that he has done so, and that you have seen him.

As a matter of information, we have, on this ship, the historical files from 1 January 1944 up to date for the Pacific Fleet PT's but we have practically nothing for the South Pacific PT's. It is my understanding that all historical files, which had been available in the South Pacific up to 1 January 1944, were sent to Los Angeles to the historical file section there. ComKTBronsPSF has the files for the Southwest Pacific command and is preparing, upon my suggestion, a factual first narrative of the developments in that command from the time the Southwest command was formed. I have issued him a directive today to prepare an administrative report for use either by this command or, by someone else, depending

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upon how the historical situation develops.

I have searched both Fleets, that is, Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons Pacific and Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons Philippine Sea Frontier for officers interested in historical writing and I have found Lieut. (jg) Imhof and a Lieutenant (jg) Quinton Isely, USNR, both of whom seem quite anxious to go ahead on the job, but neither of whom is historically trained. I think, however, that we are at least reasonably well grounded now on historical personnel. I am hoping in addition to find a more experienced officer -- that is, experienced in the Operations of the Southern Pacific Area -- to take full charge and to guide the others. From my own observations, I do not think that we will produce a very long history, as we are limited to our files on board.

I have written to Admiral Kalbfus and told him that it was my understanding, from his letter, that we wouldn't have to write any history at all, but Captain Parker is of the opinion that we will, and I am, therefore, carrying out Captain Parker's ideas unless Admiral Kalbfus directs otherwise. I have no doubt but that my historical section, even if not required to do so, can and should through research and intelligent analysis, assist in the work of any historians who may be designated by Washington to work with the motor torpedo boat personnel.

It is vitally important that you should know that the PT Command is being rolled up and that the number of PT Squadrons which will be kept active in the Pacific, will not be more than five. You should also know that once the decommissioning has been completed there will not be any Commander Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons Pacific Fleet as the plan is to dissolve that Command entirely. The Commander-in-Chief may decide to dissolve this command at any time now and leave the Commander Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons Philippine Sea Frontier, who has a greater number of motor torpedo boats to decommission than I have, to command until the job is finally completed. I am not saying that this will happen -- I am merely indicating its possibility.

Despite the above situation we will do our best to provide all that is desired. In this connection, will you please tell Lieutenant Imhof what you desire in this history and, if you can, will you give him an example of an Administrative or Command History which you consider good as a guide. Otherwise we may lose valuable time. Possibly you have a copy of something put out by CruPac, DesPac, AdComPhibsPac or AirPac. Lieutenant Imhof can take it back with him, study it in the plane, study it here with me and the rest of the Staff that are interested in this history, and then it can be sent back to you if you so desire. By doing this we can expedite our work which is apparently well behind through no fault of the Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons Pacific command.

I was awfully glad to see that you had received your other half-stripe. When I was there with you, as you will remember, I told you I was confident a mistake had been made and that the matter would be cleared up to everybody's satisfaction, although no one can ever remove from you the personal sting from the original mistake.

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24 September 1945

I have written several times to tell Captain Parker what a satisfactory performance USF-10-B has given in the Fleet. Everywhere I meet nothing but the kindest remarks. I really feel that in producing that book, the time I spent there and the help given to me by Captain Parker, yourself, by both Wards, and by the other members of the Analytical Staff, was most effectively employed and has contributed, in its way, towards final victory.

Why don't you come out here and see me! I should like very much to see you and I am sure that a little trip to the Leyte Area would be advantageous to your health.

With best regards,

R. W. BATES,
Commodore, USN.

Lieut. Comdr. John H. Kemble, USNR
Assistant Historical Officer
Staff - CinCPac
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

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MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRONS PACIFIC FLEET
Office of the Commander

24 September 1945.

Dear Overfelt:

I suppose that you are pretty busy there in the Office of the Secretary, and I have been a little reluctant to drop you a note to take your time away from far more serious endeavors. However, when you were out here at Samar with the Assistant Secretary, the Assistant Secretary and I got into a discussion of some mutual old friends. The name of these old friends was Barbara and Alexander Royce, husband and wife, and the most charming and delightful people imaginable. I am wondering if you would be willing, when you get a chance, to ask Mr. Henschel if he happens to recollect where they can be located, so that I may write them a letter.

I have always felt, over these many years, that they have been boosters of mine and I want them to know how I am, and how I am doing. As a matter of fact, you probably know better than I how I am doing, as you are the cook around the pot and I am merely part of the stew.

It was awfully nice to meet you out here and I appreciated your mind and your intelligent attitude towards the problems that were facing us when you appeared. None of us at the time really expected Japan to quit when they did, although there were two very intense schools -- one which insisted that they would quit by 1 October -- the other which felt that they would fight until the Army was defeated. Frankly, I belonged to the latter group because it is essential in military planning to consider the more difficult situation unless all the evidence, of course, is contrary.

The Japanese have behaved so well that I am hoping we won't encounter in their mental make-up, a repetition of Germany after the last war, where the German Army said that their Country had not been invaded by force of arms and that the Army had not really been defeated in the field, but that the Country had collapsed behind it. Naturally we don't subscribe to these views as we know that the Japs have been fully defeated and that they were doomed for defeat whether they surrendered now or later. I know that the thought I am giving you here is not original, but it is of interest and I choose to regard it as worthy of analysis.

I am now busily decommissioning the PT Fleet and demobilizing the personnel. No one could be more anxious than I am to complete this job, as I see no reason for employing personnel in assignments which are not of any great importance today.

I want to congratulate you upon your services to the Nation during this war. Since you were here I have taken a little time off to investigate - hearsay of course - your background, and I find that everything you have done has been very capably handled, indeed. Nice work!!

I hope that you will remember me most kindly to the Assistant Secretary. I have known him somewhat for many years, but had not seen him for

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probably ten years when he arrived at Samar. He made a very fine impression out here and everyone said that if the Secretary is as able as he is personable, the duties of the Assistant Secretary's Office are in extremely safe hands.

With warmest personal regards to you and to Mr. Henshaw and with many thanks to you if you will look up this little matter for me, I am

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES,
Commodore, USN.

Captain Perol D. Overfelt, USNR
Office of the Secretary
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

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MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRONS PACIFIC FLEET
Office of the Commander

28 September 1945

Dear H. T.:

This is merely a note to ask you if you will answer a query which I have given Lieutenant (jg) Imhof to seek an answer for from you:

- (1) Are we to decommission our engines using Chapter 9, BuShips Manual, and treating the gasoline engines as diesels, or are we to use Packard's approved plan for putting up an engine?

Frankly, I am doubtful of the efficacy of the Packard system as it is designed for a short time whereas the diesel engine lay-up - Chapter 9 - is for a long time. However, it isn't expected that these motor torpedo boats will survive over a few years at the most.

If we follow the Packard Manual we will have sufficient Grade III preservative, but if we follow Chapter 9 we will run into a shortage. If you desire that we should put them up according to the BuShips plan you had better, somehow, send some out to us -- probably as much as 5,000 gallons. The reason for this shortage is that the BuShips Manual calls for filling the entire cooling system with Grade III preservative but the Packard Manual calls for this cooling system to be clear -- with no preservative in it whatsoever.

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES,
Commodore, USN.

Rear Admiral H. T. Smith, USN
Fleet Maintenance Officer
Commander Service Force Pacific Fleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

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MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRONS PACIFIC FLEET
Office of the Commander.

28 September 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMODORE DEES

1. I am asking Lieutenant (jg) Imhof, who is in Pearl for another reason, to stop to see you long enough to get an answer to this question.
2. I have about five tender captains, including the captains of both the ACONTIUS and the CYRENE who are eligible for demobilization. I sent a speedletter to the Department, copy to you, in which I asked for reliefs for three of these tender captains. Was I right in sending to the Department, or are you the Area Commander as referred to in the Navy Subsidiary Demobilization Plan, Officer Personnel, Section 2, paragraph 1(c) - Relief of Officers?
3. A Medical Officer has just reported on board this ship for duty and he informed me that there were hundreds of officers at Pearl awaiting assignment. I think that I will not need any personnel whatsoever within the PT Command, with the exception of some senior officers for the tenders. PT officers are not big-ship trained and, although some of them will do well in big ships, I think it better that they be given training on ships where there are many officers rather than on some of these tenders where there are very few and where each one becomes very responsible immediately.
4. If you can fill these tender vacancies yourself now and will tell Lieutenant (jg) Imhof who they are and even give him a copy of their orders, it would be a great help here. Should the Department send officers out I can return them to you or you can stop them on route.

With best regards,

R. W. BATES,
Commodore, USN.

Commodore Randall E. Dees, USN
Staff - Commander Service Force Pacific Fleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

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